Because the conduct of UW is linked with a little known and poorly understood force, policymakers, strategists, and planners dismiss UW as a less relevant threat to the US, and fail to see it as a practical and sometimes appropriate offensive option. DOD used the term IW to garner the support of the Servies and Congress, but many argue that IW needs to be subordinated to the term Complex Operations, which is favored by the civil departments and agencies, and just recently was defined by the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act. c. A war conducted by irregular forces in conjunction with regularly organized forces as a phase of a normal war All of the author's arguments equating GW and IW are therefore irrelevant and have been for half a century. Meaning of irregular warfare. 78, by Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, by International Review of the Red Cross (IRRC) No. USSOCOM-The lesson identified seven core operations; counterinsurgency, stability, countering WMD, counterterrorism, support to major combat operations and campaigns, foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare. Perhaps that is because IW is different things to different people. Let's all look to the future, think strategically about how to win wars against irregular challenges or by irregular methods, and propose refinements to the forward-looking concepts captured in the IW JOC. It is the case, for instance, of Mao’s guerrilla warfare during the Chinese revolutionary war, of the Italian Brigate Partigiane’s actions against German troops between 1943 and 1945, or that of some Confederate military units, such as that under William C. Quantrill’s command, during the Secession War in the USA. Semantics, however, the perception of the 'actors' as the authors use the term is as much a determinant of what level is being addressed as anything. This paper seeks to better understand ethics in irregular war and cyber warfare. This global war has brought to life a timeless tactic called irregular warfare (IW). Original content is published under a Creative Commons License per our Terms of Use.Â, © Copyright 2021 | Site by 3C Web Services, Irregular Warfare: Everything yet Nothing, by Air University: Wright Flyer Paper No. In fact, the Joint Staff rejected the study and the study has been widely repudiated by the DOD components. The first step is to recognize that SF does not own the UW mission.  It is a US national strategic mission. Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (Paperback) by. While I agree with the authors that the apparent decision to not use the term Low Intensity Conflict for a number of miltary potentialities that do not include IW or GW, I think perhaps they also have missed the boat on what exactly IW is. He explained that irregular warfare (IW) included counter-insurgency (COIN), counter-terrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), sabotage and subversion, as well as stabilization (warfare) and information operations (IO), among other areas. A war conducted by irregular forces (supported by an external power) to bring about a change in the social-political order of a country without engaging it in a formal, declared war That process, which went hand in hand with the growth of nation-states, came to a head in the second half of the seventeenth century. 5 Pillars of Irregular Warfare (IW) FID. The Vietnamese didn't intend to defeat us by defeating our military, all their attacks were focused on our home population, which effectively led to political paralysis in the end. As discussed briefly in the previous post, current US military doctrine describes irregular warfare as having five core activities: counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations (SO). Given the significance and long-term DoD investments in the concepts presented in the IW JOC, this paper will analyze whether DoD has presented an appropriate definition of IW based on a doctrinal review of IW's roots. b. (IW JOC 1.0) Yet, with no firm understanding or consensus on what IW actually means, the Department of Defense (DoD) developed the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) on 11 September 2007. These Five Pillars were published in 2011. In fact that statement was superceded when the term UW replaced the term GW as the umbrella term in the 1955 version of FM 31-21. However, tactical and operational cooperation and collaboration is not enough.  Often, strategic-level analysis and decision making that is critical for UW is stifled because of the widely held belief that UW belongs solely to SOF, and in particular to SF. How is irregular war conducted? Christopher J. Heatherly and Casey T. McNicholas. Notably the relationship between US and China. I agree that the definition of IW may not be the the be-all, end-all, but lets face fact. That the 2006 Irregular Warfare Special Study by the Joint Warfighter Center is a reputable source document. IW JOC 1.0 is just that. I contend that the Department is better served by this community devoting energy to implementing the decision, instead of wasting time re-debating the commander's decision. After 9/11, we identified a need to create a description for what to many appeared to be a new form of warfare – this became Irregular Warfare. I suggest that the IW currently being waged in Afghanistan is in fact at the operational level as it effectively occupies the whole of NATO and US effort there. UW. Information and translations of irregular warfare in the most comprehensive dictionary definitions resource on the web. As a wise USMC 0-6 said recently, "IW, its been decided, now lets get on with it.". Covert action is a tool U.S. policymakers employ to meet U.S. national security objectives. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. If necessary, the authors will propose a more fitting definition for IW that is aligned with its doctrinal characterization. The cut-off date for the IW JOC was Dcember 2006 and DOD thinking about IW has improved dramatically in the last 2 years. Reinforces my feeling that we need a strategic pause in new concept development as we have reached concept/terminology/definition paralysis or overload. Focusing your efforts on the populace enables you to defeat the resistance organization, not just the overt guerrillas. Also called IW. How will DOD respond to, or present, such challenges in the future? They were much more diplomatic than what I intended to post. Irregular warfare remains in the forefront of the Air Force’s warfighting focus. I learned long ago that you present COAs to the commander and he makes the call. Show More. Examining each of these pillars of power will illustrate the advantage the United States has already demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how these pillars will give us the strategic advantage in irregular warfare or “COIN,” going forward. It is generally associated with broad movements that may be briefly described as What we need are policy makers, strategists and planners who have a deep understanding of and an appreciation for unconventional warfare.  We need UW to be taught in professional military education institutions to non-SOF personnel.  We need to ensure that members of the interagency and the joint military have a thorough understanding of threats conducting UW and how to counter them.  We need academic institutions and think tanks to recognize, study, write about and advocate and education for UW.  Perhaps the historic Special Operations Research Office at American University, which was disbanded in the 1960s, should be re-established. A people's war or revolution against existing authority The hostile states and state-like adversaries that challenge our nation seek to gain legitimacy and influence or control over relevant populations, and if we are to prevail we must prevent them from doing so and instead win the suppport of those populations for an alternative strategic narrative at least as compelling as our adversaries' narratives. In 2009 before the House Armed Services Committee on by Lieutenant Colonel (P) William Stevenson, Major Marshall Ecklund, Major Hun Soo Kim and Major Robert Billings, Small Wars Journal, Irregular Warfare: Everything yet Nothing (Full PDF Article). The authors "...have determined that the definition of IW should be:

"Combat operations conducted by the overt element of an insurgency in enemy-held territory, by predominately indigenous and irregular forces organized on a military or paramilitary basis, characterized by the extensive use of unorthodox tactics to reduce the combat effectiveness, industrial capacity, and morale of an enemy, usually an established civil and military authority. The take away is that the violence is ultimately directed at relevant population group, not defeating the opposing military directly, and that is the difference between IW and conventional war. David S. Maxwell is the Associate Director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University. Definition of irregular warfare in the Definitions.net dictionary. Well worth the read.  But the fact remains that, notwithstanding the notoriety of  highly visible missions such as the Bin Laden raid, years of paying little attention to SOF has led to a situation in which SOF activities and missions are not well understood, accepted, or sought after. The terrorists who conducted the Madrid bombings were not focused on Spain's economy or security forces, but rather influencing the voting population, which in this case effectively resulted in the anti-war candidate being elected and the withdrawal of their military from Iraq. for Irregular Warfare William Fleser 23 Chapter 5. ), and it was effective where applied, unfortunately it was applied on too small of scale until later in the war. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Under CIA control, Army UW/GW would attrite enemy forces until conventional forces liberated occupied territory. Just as combined arms are complementary at the tactical level, the IW JOC argues for complementary COIN, FID, CT, and UW activities woven into the tapestry of a holistic IW campaign designed to achieve the objectives of a global or theater IW strategy. For example, the term IW ia an anathema to the civil departments and agencies of the US Government, and to many of our allies and coalition partners. Lawrence All the options on the term and the definition were presented to the Senior Leadership and they decided. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of … The first iteration of an intellectual journey designed to help DOD think about the generational war being waged against state-like violent extremist organizations. While Velupillai Prabhakaran is very much concerned with a population, I suspect he also thinks his effort is a strategic effort. It is their holistic applicaiton to achieve a strategic purpose of global or regional significance that is new within DOD. Yet, with no firm understanding or consensus on what IW actually means, the Department of Defense (DoD) developed the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) on 11 September 2007. COIN. Our problem is with the nature of special operations itself.  Until recent years in the post 9-11 world, SOF has been associated with secrecy and compartmentalization.  These are critically important requirements for special operations. Within the context of this understanding of the operating environment, five types of activities or operations (the 5 “pillars” of conducting irregular warfare) comprise the strategy for addressing irregular threats; these include: counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. In short, I think this is a search for unneeded precision. Progress wasn't made until the additional troops were sent in to protect the populace to break the coercive influence link between the insurgent and the populace. 913 Words 4 Pages. This global war has brought to life a timeless tactic called irregular warfare (IW). I will bet the Korean co-author of this paper probably knew the US doctrine the best and was a great help in the historical perspective as our Korean SF brothers still use much of our old Special Forces doctrine. Furthermore it is hard to kill the bad guys you can't see, and we can't win by only defeating the overt forces. The history of IW needs closer examination to capture those lessons learned to advance the IW discussion beyond the IW JOC. Such a campaign and strategy should focus on the population, not the adversary, because it is the population that will ultimately decide which side prevails in the struggle for legitimcy, influence, and control. Rather than being viewed as a list of discrete options, these activities (sometimes called the five “pillars” of … The pillars of the trinity provide a foundation to understand how hybrid warfare employs irregular, unconventional, and conventional military power to balance against the risk of war trending towards absolute violence and open conflict. by Admin. The world has changed since 1951. As we know, the five pillars of irregular warfare are rooted within these seven core operations. The working group sought to develop a more universal definition, one that would describe the intent and methodology of an unconventional warfare (UW) strategy that would not be exclusive to the United States but rather, would also be able to describe UW from an enemy point of view (As I have argued recently, we should not be concerned with Al Qaeda and terrorism in the way that we have been since 9-11; instead we must focus on the unconventional warfare strategy that al-Qaeda is executing against the United States, the West and selected nations in the Middle East). Which tells us that cyber warfare is a relatively new. Consider this. The Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy called for the capabilities that the U.S. developed in irregular warfare during the war on terrorism to be shifted to the higher priorities of the NDS of rogue state actors and great-power competitors. Drive by COIN and targeting only overt guerrillas is clearly a recipe for failure. V/R Dave. In a global struggle against such adversries, it no longer makes sense to think about insurgency, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorirsm as disjointed activities. The early Cold War Army doctrine envisioned the employment of UW/GW in Soviet-occupied territory in WWIII, supporting resistance movements not unlike those that resisted the Axis Power occupations of WWII. As presented, the definitions and concepts in the IW JOC have unnecessarily created confusion within the DoD by ignoring more than fifty years of experience and doctrine related to the challenges faced by the post-Cold War world and after the events of September 11, 2001. Irregular warfare is the oldest form of warfare, and it is a phenomenon that goes by many names, including tribal warfare, primitive warfare, "little wars," and low-intensity conflict. Unconventional warfare consists of activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to. T.E. First they claim the strategic level of IW is the underground, and that the underground is largely focused on the populace (thus strategic victory = populace), and then they argue that IW should only be focused on the overt guerrillas, or at the tactical level? As the authors probably know, there may be several relevant population groups that the competitors may want to influence, to include external actors. Irregular warfare (IW) is defined in United States joint doctrine as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations." 64 books based on 27 votes: Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph by T.E. While it is important to know our history, it is a sin to become enslaved by it. Fortunately, for the Joint Warfighter, the intent of the IW JOC was only to further IW discussion, debate, and experimentation intended to influence future IW concepts and capability development. UW is not a mission for all threats, and not all threats are unconventional.  But such threats do exist and they should not be neglected, overlooked, or left only to SOF. "

I'm curious as to their rationale to apparently discard totally items c. and d. above. The term irregular warfare seems best to capture the wide variety of these "little wars." Army Special Forces would orgnize, train, equip guerrilla forces just as the Operational Group Command of the OSS did in WWII. 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Therefore, when a new concept for building partner capacity and training, advising and assisting was needed for the regular Army and Marine Corps, doctrine writers developed Security Force Assistance rather than start from the established doctrine in FID and altering it as necessary. AQ's focus on various external population groups is plain to see, and they are trying to isolate their opponents by cutting off external support. Surely there is some redundancy between unconventional warfare and irregular warfare in this definition and students of doctrine can argue the pros and cons of whether one or the other or both should be used.   However, little, if any, thought was given to whether the complex threats we have faced since 9/11 should, in fact, be considered unconventional warfare. In Vietnam, securing and mobilizing the populace was critical (CIDG, Phoenix, etc. As it turns out, the pre-9/11 FID doctrine expressly stated that all services were to provide trained and ready forces to conduct FID in support of the GCCs.  Yet when the need arose the services chose to start from scratch due to a mistaken belief that FID was exclusively a SOF activity. a. The antipathy of the occupied population toward their occupiers was a given. Donald Sparks, U.S. Army, Signing up for this newsletter means you agree to our data policy, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Photo Credit: Master Sgt. Subversion, sabotage, disruption, attacking civilians, influencing population, terrorism, organized crime, etc What are the 5 pillars of irregular warfare Glenn, thank you for your words of wisdom. The CIA would organize, train, equip the underground, so that piece of the puzzle was never written into unclassified Army doctrine and the strategic purpose of UW was downplayed because it was not within the purview of DOD. How they fight and what or who they fight for is widely variable; the population may be involved or may not be; they may support or may not. I propose that the time to debate the term and meaning of IW is long past.  SF is organized, trained, equipped, educated and optimized for a particular aspect of UW: to work “through and with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.”   Beyond that, the decision, the strategy, and the campaign plan to enable a resistance or guerrilla force to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power is made at the strategic level at what we once called the National Command Authority – this is outside the sole purview of SOF and SF. ""